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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs/Appellants Wendy and Kay Gudmundson (referred to collectively as
"the Gudmundsons") sued for Mrs. Gudmundson's brain injury, alleging it was caused by
exposure to ozone during a week in December 2004 at the Utah State Prison. The
Gudmundsons allege Mrs. Gudmundson was exposed to dangerous levels of ozone
because Johnson Controls, OzoneSolutions, and Del Ozone negligently installed a
laundry ozone system at the prison.
Del Ozone, however, was a supplier, not an installer. Its role in the matter was
limited to filling a purchase order for an ozone generator submitted to it by
OzoneSolutions. The District Court granted Del Ozone's motion for summary judgment
on the ground that the Gudmundsons presented no evidence that the ozone generator was
defective. In reaching this decision, the District Court noted that John Downey, the
owner-operator of OzoneSolutions who installed the generator, testified that he tested the
ozone generator after installation and it functioned properly. Because the Gudmundsons
submitted no evidence to rebut this testimony, the District Court's decision should be
affirmed.
The Gudmundsons tacitly conceded that they did not carry their burden of
submitting evidence sufficient to overcome summary judgment by requesting time for
additional discovery under Rule 56(f). The District Court, however, denied this motion
on the grounds that the Gudmundsons had ample time - 2 years - to conduct discovery,
they received multiple extensions to discovery deadlines, and they failed to articulate
ii

how the discovery sought would help them overcome summary judgment. Under Utah
law, Rule 56(f) motions are upheld unless the District Court abused its discretion. The
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because the
Gudmundsons had ample time to conduct discovery and the discovery sought would not
establish the ozone generator was defective.
The District Court denied Del Ozone's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that Del Ozone did not owe a duty to Mrs. Gudmundson, ruling that it was "not
unforeseeable" that Mrs. Gudmundson could be injured by Del Ozone's product.
Foreseeability, however, is only one of four factors a court must consider before
imposing a duty. The other three factors - the likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the
burden guarding against it, and the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant
- all weigh in favor of not imposing a duty. Thus, this Court should affirm summary
judgment in favor of Del Ozone on this ground as well.
Finally, the District Court granted summary judgment for all defendants on the
ground of collateral estoppel. The District Court ruled that the Utah Labor Commission's
determination that Mrs. Gudmundson was not injured by exposure to ozone precluded
relitigation of the same issue in this case. The Court found that Mrs. Gudmundson had
the ability in her worker's compensation proceeding to be represented by counsel, present
evidence, and call and cross-examine witnesses, including expert witnesses. Moreover,
the Utah Labor Commission relied on an Independent Medical Examination that found
there was no evidence Mrs. Gudmundson's injuries were caused by exposure to ozone
after a careful examination of her medical records and an inspection of the laundry ozone
iii

system at the prison. Because the elements for collateral estoppel have been satisfied, the
District Court's decision on this ground should be affirmed.
For each of these reasons, judgment in favor of Del Ozone should be affirmed.

iv
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IL STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(j) ("orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.").
Ill, SUMMARY OF ISSUES
The following are the issues relating to whether summary judgment in favor of
defendant/appellant Del Ozone should be affirmed:
I.

II.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying the Gudmundsons'
Rule 56(f) motion for additional time?
A.

Will the discovery requested in the Gudmundsons' 56(f) affidavit (1) interpretation of Mrs. Gudmundson's MRIs, (2) information on
neurotoxicity of ozone water disinfectant system, (3) information on
water pulled from geothermal well beneath Bluffdale Prison, and (4)
information from Del Ozone on whether instruments similar to
ozone generator installed at prison have had defect problems produce evidence that the ozone generator installed at the Bluffdale
Prison was defective?

B.

Were there legitimate reasons that the Gudmundsons were unable
to conduct this discovery during the two years between the time they
filed their Complaint and Del Ozone moved for summary judgment?

Did the District Court err in granting Del Ozone summary judgment on the
ground that the Gudmundsons presented no evidence that the generator was
defective?
A.

Can Del Ozone be liable absent evidence that the ozone generator
was defective?

B.

Is there any evidence to rebut the testimony of John Downey, owneroperator of OzoneSolutions, that the ozone generator was
functioning properly after installation at the Bluffdale Prison?

C.

III.

IV.

Does the lack of an automatic shut-off or ambient ozone monitor
constitute a defect?

Should summary judgment in favor of Del Ozone also be affirmed on the
ground that Del Ozone did not owe a duty to the Gudmundsons?
A.

Should the District Court have considered factors in addition to
forseeability prior to determining that Del Ozone owed the
Gudmundsons a duty?

B.

Under Utah law, did Del Ozone owe Mrs. Gudmundson a duty of
care based on the sale of its generator to OzoneSolutions?

Should summary judgment in favor of all defendants be affirmed on the
ground of Collateral Estoppel?
IV, SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the Gudmundsons' Rule 56(f) motion.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Gudmundsons' Rule
56(f) motion for three reasons. First, the discovery the Gudmundsons sought will not
lead to evidence that the ozone generator was defective, and therefore will not provide a
basis for reversing summary judgment for Del Ozone. Second, the Gudmundsons had
two years to conduct the discovery they sought and they did not provide a satisfactory
explanation as to why they were unable to conduct this discovery during that time period.
Third, the Gudmundsons' complaint that Del Ozone refused to stipulate to extend
discovery deadlines for a third time fails because Del Ozone was under no duty to do so
and the two years prior to Del Ozone's refusal provided the Gudmundsons with ample
time to conduct discovery.
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II.

The District Court correctly granted Del Ozone summary judgment
because the Gudmundsons presented no evidence that the ozone
generator was defective.

The District Court correctly granted Del Ozone summary judgment. Del Ozone's
role in this matter was limited to filling OzoneSolutions' purchase order for an ozone
generator. OzoneSolutions installed the laundry ozone system, including the ozone
generator, at the Bluffdale Prison. OzoneSolutions selected and purchased the generator
from Del Ozone and OzoneSolutions installed it at the prison. Following installation, the
generator was functioning properly according to John Downey, owner-operator of
OzoneSolutions. The Gudmundsons presented no evidence rebutting Mr. Downey's
testimony. Instead, the Gudmundsons argued without proof that the absence of an
automatic shut-off and an ozone monitor constituted defects. These items, however, are
accessories, not defects, and the Gudmundsons provide no evidence, expert or otherwise,
supporting their assertion that the absence of these items constitutes a design or
manufacturing defect.
III.

In any event, the District Court should not have ruled Del Ozone owed
the Gudmundsons a duty.

The District Court's analysis of whether Del Ozone owed the Gudmundsons a
duty was incomplete. Duty is not solely determined by foreseeability. Under Utah law,
the existence of a duty depends on balancing four factors: (1) foreseeability, (2) the
likelihood of injury, (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it, and (4) the
consequences of placing this burden on the defendant. See Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch,
1000 UT 20, \\2.

In the present case, the foreseeability was remote, as was the
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likelihood of injury. By contrast, the consequences of placing a burden on Del Ozone
would be extreme. No vendor who merely fills a purchase order, like Del Ozone, should
be expected to insure proper installation of the parts ordered. Moreover, defendants
Johnson Controls and OzoneSolutions are in a better position to answer for injuries
stemming from installation because Johnson Controls contracted with the State to install
the laundry ozone system and OzoneSolutions performed the installation.
IV.

The District Court correctly granted summary judgment to all
defendants on the ground of Collateral Estoppel.

The collateral estoppel arguments have been briefed by counsel for
OzoneSolutions and Johnson Controls. Del Ozone hereby incorporates each and every
argument in favor of collateral estoppel made and described by counsel for
OzoneSolutions and Johnson Controls in their respective briefs.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

The State of Utah hired Johnson Controls to install a Laundry Ozone
System at its Bluffdale Prison and Johnson Controls hired
OzoneSolutions to perform the installation.

In early 2004, Johnson Controls contracted with the State of Utah to install a
laundry ozone system at its Bluffdale, Utah prison. (ROA 241). A laundry ozone system
is an energy conservation system that reduces the amount of hot water and the total
amount of water necessary for laundry by infusing washing machines with ozone. See
Deposition of John Downey, at 12 (ROA 241). A laundry ozone system is designed for
each laundry room based on two criteria: "one, how many washers are in the laundry;
and, two, the size of the incoming water line." Deposition of John Downey, at 13 (ROA
4

240). Based on the number of washers and size of the water line, the installer, in this
case OzoneSolutions, determines the size of the ozone generator, the central component
of the system. See Deposition of John Downey, at 14 (ROA 240). Other components
included in a laundry ozone system include piping, a booster pump, and an ozone
deconstruct module that converts the excess ozone back to oxygen. See Deposition of
John Downey, at 15 (ROA 240).
Johnson Controls hired OzoneSolutions, L.C., to furnish and install the laundry
ozone system at the Bluffdale Prison. See Deposition of John Downey, at 28 (ROA 241).
Prior to this project, OzoneSolutions had installed approximately 200 laundry ozone
systems. See Deposition of John Downey, at 52 (ROA 245). Based on this experience,
OzoneSolutions had developed expertise in the installation of laundry ozone systems and
their owner-operator, John Downey, testified:
Q: On the hierarchy - there is the State of Utah, Del Ozone,
OzoneSolutions, and Johnson Controls. Who is the expert on that machine
that you installed? When I mean "expert," who was the expert on the
specifications of how that machine works out of those four entities?
A: Say it again who they were.
Q: State of Utah, Del Ozone, OzoneSolutions, Johnson Controls. Who is
the leading expert of those four entities that knows the most about how that
machine works that you installed?
A: OzoneSolutions.
Deposition of John Downey, at 101-102 (ROA 249).
II.

The Installation of the Laundry Ozone System.

OzoneSolutions installed the laundry ozone system at the Bluffdale Prison in early
December of 2004. Tom Carson from Johnson Controls provided OzoneSolutions with
"all the information on the number of washers and the size of the incoming lines."
5

Deposition of John Downey, at 19 (ROA 241). Based on the information provided by
Johnson Controls, OzoneSolutions selected the components for the system.
Although the Gudmundsons contend that "[t]he ozone generating system had been
designed in part by Del Ozone;" this misstates Del Ozone's involvement in the
installation of the laundry ozone system at the Bluffdale Prison. Based on the
information provided by Johnson Controls, OzoneSolutions selected the components for
the laundry ozone system and installed the entire system, including the ozone generator,
without Del Ozone's assistance or consultation. See Deposition of John Downey, at 13
(ROA 240). Mr. Downey testified:
Q: Once you decided on the size of the generator and the
different equipment that you were going to use in the prison
system, did you advise Del Ozone of that?
A: Only through when we gave them a purchase order to buy
it.
Deposition of John Downey, at 31 (ROA 241). In fact, OzoneSolutions opted to install a
generator that it knew Del Ozone would not have recommended. Based on the number of
washers and the size of the water line at the prison, OzoneSolutions determined that the
laundry ozone system required a 15-gram generator. OzoneSolutions made this decision
without consulting Del Ozone and Mr. Downey testified that he believed Del Ozone
would have recommended a larger generator for the'project:
Q: [D]id you purchase the generator before you arrived at the job site?
A: We issued the purchase orders for all of the equipment prior to us
arriving, yes.
Q: Del Ozone wasn't involved in deciding whether to use a 15-gram or
wasn't involved in deciding whether to use that specific generator?
A: No. Actually, the size that Del Ozone uses would have to be a larger
generator than that.
6

Q: Okay. So you made the decision, not Del Ozone, to use the 15-gram
generator?
A: Correct.
See Deposition of John Downey, at 37-38 (ROA 242). It is undisputed that
OzoneSolutions provided no information to Del Ozone about the laundry ozone system at
the prison other than the purchase order for the ozone generator. See Deposition of John
Downey, at 13 (ROA 240). It is also undisputed that Del Ozone did not help install the
laundry ozone system at the prison in any way. See Deposition of John Downey, at 171172 (ROA 248-249).
When the installation was complete, OzoneSolutions tested the laundry ozone
system, including the ozone generator, to make sure that it was functioning properly. Mr.
Downey testified:
Q: And what is the - the purpose of the machine is to generate ozone;
right? The purpose of the ozone generator is to generate ozone?
A: The primary component of a laundry ozone system is an ozone
generator. The ozone generator is a combination of oxygen generator and
ozone generator. It takes the ambient air, which has 20.9 percent oxygen,
strips the nitrogen, and hydrogen air and increases that to 95 percent and
then takes that 95 percent oxygen over to what they call a corona discharge
cell, which is an electrical charge that splits the 0 2 molecule apart and
makes ozone. So it makes higher concentrations of oxygen and then makes
ozone. So it is a dual-purpose generator.
Q: When you installed this machine, did you check to make sure that it was
doing both of those functions?
A: Yes.
Q: And it was doing both of those functions as of December 10?
A: Yes.
0 : Or 9m when you did the installation?
A: Yes.
Deposition of John Downey, at 172-173 (ROA 251).
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The Gudmundsons submitted no evidence contradicting Mr. Downey's testimony
that the ozone generator functioned properly. The District Court noted the absence of
evidence that the ozone generator was defective, stating:
I do agree with Del Ozone that at least based on my review of
the submissions, the plaintiff presented no evidence that the
Ozone generator was defective. While it is true that there
appears to be some evidence that there may have been some
venting issues, I found nothing that indicated factually a
problem with the generator itself.
Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing, ROA 1890, at 6 (emphasis added). The
Gudmundsons did not even designate an expert witness who is qualified to testify
concerning defects in ozone generators.
Rather than submit evidence of a defect in the ozone generator, the Gudmundsons
claimed that the lack of an automatic shut-off and ambient ozone monitor constitute
defects. However, Mr. Downey testified that such items are not standard features of a
laundry ozone system and that they are installed at the client's, in this case Johnson
Controls or the State of Utah's, request:
Q: Have you ever installed any monitors - with these 200
jobs that you installed, do you ever install any ozone monitors
with them?
A: The ORP monitor and controllers is an ozone monitor.
We do that with every system.
Q: I mean, like the monitors that we just went over that had
those readings.
A: The ambient ozone monitors?
Q: Yeah.
A: Have ever installed one?
Q: Yes.
A: Yes.
Q: Why - how do you decide when you do or don't install?
8

A: We don't decide. If the client wants it, they ask for it. Or
if we give them the option, they ask for it.
Q: Who would have decided in this case - who had that
decision whether or not monitors should be installed?
A: We normally give the customer the option to put one in or
not.
Q: You say you do, meaning OzoneSolutions or Johnson
Controls does?
A: We ask the customer.
Q: Did you ask the State of Utah if they wanted a monitor?
A: I had no communication with the State of Utah.
Q: So do you know if anybody asked the State of Utah or
explained to them why you might want a monitor?
A: No.
Q: Would that be your job to go to the State of Utah and say,
"You might want a monitor because sometimes the ozone
leaks"?
A: No. If I felt our system MR. MAHLER: Object to form.
A: If I felt like our system needed an ambient ozone monitor,
it would be a standard feature. I don't believe the Del Ozone
generator needs one.
Deposition of John Downey, at 169-171, ROA 248. Mr. Downey also testified that he
generally opted not to use such a monitor:
Q: Why do they sometimes put - do you know why
sometimes the monitors installed in the system?
A: If it is in the specifications or the customer asks for it.
Q: So in these specifications that came to you, the
specifications came from Johnson Controls, is that right?
A: They didn't have any specifications on the ozone system
other than a generic sentence.
*

*

*

Q: Do you know why nobody talked about a monitor in this
case?
A: I don't believe with the Del Ozone generator an ambient
ozone monitor is necessary.
Q: So it was your personal call it wasn't necessary A: It is OzoneSolutions' call. It is not involved with our
system.
9

Q: So OzoneSolutions' call was, "We don't even need to
bring up the monitor with the State of Utah because it is
unnecessary"?
A: Correct.
Deposition of John Downey, at 169-171, ROA 248 (emphasis added). Thus
OzoneSolutions, not Del Ozone, decided not to install an ambient ozone monitor.
Following installation and testing, Johnson Controls and OzoneSolutions
conducted an in-service training session at the prison. See Deposition of John Downey,
at 106 (ROA 250). Del Ozone did not participate in the training session. See Deposition
of John Downey, at 73-74 (ROA 246). Mrs. Gudmundson, a prison employee in the
laundry at the time, attended the training session. See Deposition of Wendy
Gudmundson, at 50 (ROA 255). In addition to the training session, Mrs. Gudmundson
was also provided with a safety manual for the ozone generator, which she testified that
she read:
Q: Do you remember being given or having access to any type of
publications, either like an owners' manual or any type of manual that
talked about the ozone machine?
A: Yes. He gave us a manual.
Q: Okay. And did you have your own copy, or was there just a couple of
copies laying around the office?
A: There was one copy for the office and then one for maintenance.
Q: I see. Did you have access to that manual?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you ever take the time to read through it?
A: Yes.
Deposition of Wendy Gudmundson, at 47 (ROA 254).
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III.

Mrs. Gudmundson's Injuries.

The prison began using the laundry ozone system on Monday, December 13,
2004. Mrs. Gudmundson worked on that Monday, but did not recall whether she had a
headache. See Deposition of Wendy Gudmundson, at 53-54 (ROA 256). Mrs.
Gudmundson first recalled having a headache on Tuesday, December 14, 2004. She
described it as a dull headache that rated a 4 on a scale of 1 to 10. See Deposition of
Wendy Gudmundson, at 56-58 (ROA 256-257). Mrs. Gudmundson woke up with a
similar headache on December 15, 16, and 17, 2004. See Deposition of Wendy
Gudmundson, at 65-67 (ROA 258). This week was the only period in which Mrs.
Gudmundson was exposed to ozone from the prison's laundry ozone system.
Mrs. Gudmundson also woke up with a headache on Saturday, December 18,
2004; however, this headache did not prevent her from travelling to the desert to search
for gems. On that day, she woke up at approximately 5 a.m. and accompanied her
husband and a friend, Clyde Sowers, into the desert near Duchesne to search for gems.
They arrived in Duchesne around 10:30 a.m. As they searched for gems, Mrs.
Gudmundson testified that her headache grew progressively worse and she left with her
husband around 2 p.m. See Deposition of Wendy Gudmundson, at 75-77 (ROA 259260). Mrs. Gudmundson also testified that she had eaten only some pretzels and jerky
prior to leaving Duchesne with her husband at 2 p.m. See Deposition of Wendy
Gudmundson, at 78 (ROA 260). Mrs. Gudmundson testified that her headache continued
on Sunday and her husband took her to the hospital on Monday, December 20, 2004. See
Deposition of Wendy Gudmundson, at 83-84 (ROA 261). On Tuesday, December 21,
11

2004, Mrs. Gudmundson underwent a CT scan and MRI of her brain at Timpanogos
Regional Hospital, both of which revealed normal findings. See Timpanogos Regional
Hospital report (ROA 267-270).
Over a month later, on January 27, 2005, Mrs. Gudmundson underwent an MRI of
the cervical spine which revealed a Chiari I malformation. See Report of Central Utah
Medical Clinic (ROA 272). Even though Mrs. Gudmundson had not been exposed to the
laundry ozone system at the prison during the intervening month, she still claimed it
caused her condition.
On February 1, 2005, Mrs. Gudmundson saw Dr. Howard Reichmann. Dr.
Reichmann noted "Patient's symptoms are not typical for a Chiari malformation ...
Chiari malformations almost never cause frontal headaches and they are almost always
neck and occipital." Report of Dr. Howard Reichmann (ROA 274-276). Nevertheless,
Dr. Reichmann recommended that the Chiari malformation should be decompressed for
safety purposes. Report of Dr. Howard Reichmann (ROA 274-276). On March 2, 2005,
Dr. Howard Reichmann performed a suboccipital craniectomy with decompression of the
foramen magnum, duraplasty and decompression on Mrs. Gudmundson. See Utah Valley
Regional Medical Center Operation Report (ROA 278-279).
Mrs. Gudmundson had an extensive medical history prior to December of 2004,
when the laundry ozone system was installed at the prison. Mrs. Gudmundson is an
alcoholic and she has struggled with anorexia and bulimia throughout her adult life. She
has smoked since she was 17 and she also has anemia. And prior to December 2004, Ms.
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Gudmundson did not participate in any exercise routine. See Deposition of Wendy
Gudmundson, at 108, 112-114,116, 120 (ROA 262-265).
IV.

There is no evidence the level of ozone in the prison exceeded EPA
recommendations.

The Gudmundsons assert in their appellate brief that "[e]ven after ventilation was
put in to try and control ozone levels, the ambient ozone levels continued to exceed
OSHA and EPA levels." Opening Brief, at 6. However, they failed to submit any
evidence that the ozone levels at the prison exceeded OSHA and EPA levels. The
Gudmundsons' statement is not supported by any citation to the record. A close review
of the Gudmundsons' memorandum in opposition to summary judgment also reveals that
there is no evidence the ozone levels at the prison during the week of December 13, 2004
exceeded OSHA and/or EPA levels. To the contrary, the Gudmundsons submitted only
their own conjecture combined with an affidavit by Jesse Mansanarez, a prisoner who
also worked in the laundry, stating that he smelled the ozone when the machine was
turned on. This does not establish the level of ozone in the laundry room when Mrs.
Gudmundson was present.
V.

Mrs. Gudmundson's Worker's Compensation Claim.

On May 13, 2005, Mrs. Gudmundson filed an Application for Hearing with the
Utah Labor Commission alleging entitlement to compensation for medical expenses and
disability as a result of overexposure to ozone at the Draper prison on December 17,
2004. See Utah Labor Commission Order (ROA 281). The Utah Labor Commission
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requested an independent medical examination, which was conducted by Dr. Edward
Holmes on December 8, 2005. Dr. Holmes concluded:
Based on our review of the medical records, our examination of Ms.
Gudmundson, a site visit and a literature review we think that she suffered
of severe migraine headaches. These headaches may have been triggered
or temporarily exacerbated by ozone exposure or have appeared due to the
normal evolution of the Chiari malformation. There is no indication in the
literature that the Chiari malformation could have resulted from ozone
exposure ... Severe migraine headaches may lead to the discovery of the
Chiari malformation, which was already present.
It is also important to note, that at no time, during our evaluation or
in the medical records, did Mrs. Gudmundson report irritative symptoms to
the eyes or lungs (a common first indicator of significant ozone exposure).
In the case of an acute and significant exposure these respiratory symptoms
are expected...
... In short, if she had sufficient dose of ozone to cause brain edema
or swelling she would have had massive toxicity elsewhere, especially in
her lungs, as would other workers in the area.
We think this patient presented with a real and painful medical
condition (Chiari 1) requiring extensive medical and surgical treatment but
it is not medically reasonable to conclude that the Chiari 1 malformation
was caused by ozone exposure.
Letter of Edward B. Holmes (Emphasis added.) (ROA 295).
On October 2, 2006, Utah Labor Commission Judge Hann dismissed Mrs.
Gudmundson's application with prejudice, stating, "The petitioner did not suffer a
compensable occupational disease as the result of exposure to ozone in December 2004
while employed by the respondent, State of Utah." Utah Labor Commission Order (ROA
283).
On November 1, 2006, Mrs. Gudmundson filed a Motion for Review by the Utah
Labor Commission Appeals Board based on the Discovery of New Evidence. In this
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motion, Mrs. Gudmundson conceded that her injuries were not directly caused by
exposure to ozone. She stated:
Petitioner believes exposure to levels of ozone above the
OSHA permissible exposure levels caused her to suffer
severe headaches, nausea, and vomiting. These symptoms, in
turn, naturally led Petitioner's physician, Dr. Howard
Reichman, to run tests on the Petitioner for meningitis, one of
which involved performing a spinal tap. It was this spinal
tap, in the course of routine diagnostic testing, that caused
Petitioner's Chiari malformation, resulting brain surgery, and
total disability, as illustrated by medical papers on acquired
Chiari malformations due to lumbar punctures attached to this
Motion for Review. It is acknowledged that the ozone
exposure did not directly cause Petitioner's neurological
problems, but in the course of being treated for ozone
exposure, Petitioner was subjected to a reasonable, standard,
routine, and even necessary diagnostic procedure to rule out
meningitis, which, in turn triggered a Chiari malformation,
required brain surgery, and ultimately left the Petitioner with
serious, permanent neurological and physical handicaps. That
said, the mechanism that started the entire chain reaction, was
exposure to dangerous levels of ozone at work in the prison
laundry.
Petitioner's Motion for Review, ROA 1339 (emphasis added). On April 23, 2007, the
Utah Labor Commission's Appeals Board affirmed Judge Hann's ruling. See Order
Affirming ALJ's Decision (ROA 357-360). Mrs. Gudmundson chose not to appeal this
ruling.
In their brief, the Gudmundsons attack the Labor Commission's finding by
claiming that the process was insufficient, rather than by providing evidence that the
conclusion was wrong. The Gudmundsons list the following alleged deficiencies in the
process:
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(1) "[b]ecause the worker's compensation system is set up to
expedite the award of benefits to an injured worker, most
applicants do not develop a worker's compensation case as
they would a personal injury lawsuit;" (2) written expert
reports are submitted rather than testimony and crossexamination of medical experts; (3) It is rare to take a
deposition of a defense doctor; (4) "[i]t is rare for an
applicant's attorney to hire their own medical expert, due
mainly to financial considerations; and (5) "[t]he standards of
review of medical and other evidence are different in Labor
Commission matters than litigation in the district courts.
Appellants' Brief, at 8.
The contentions listed above are fatal to this appeal for two reasons. First, the
procedures noted did not prevent the Gudmundsons from being represented by counsel,
submitting evidence, cross-examining witnesses and providing their own expert
witnesses. Rather, they simply highlight that the Gudmundsons chose not to do this. In
fact, in some respects, the the Gudmundsons benefited from the lower standards. For
instance, the Independent Medical Examination summarized a June 28, 2005 letter from
Dr. Howard Reichman, stating, "Dr. Reichman in which he ... explains that ozone
exposure was responsible for brain swelling and that the lumbar puncture allowed a
negative pressure to develop in the spinal canal, which in turn allowed the tonsils to drop.
[Note: No brain swelling was ever objectively documented on any objective test]. (ROA,
292-293) (emphasis redacted). However, the actual letter from Dr. Reichman contains no
such conclusion. It states:
She had presented with an ozone toxicity, which then lead to
the need for a lumbar puncture, which then lead to a Chiari
malformation and tight posterior fossa, which lead to a
surgical decompression. She was having wicked, severe
headaches, drop attacks, and couldn't stand up-right. Dr. Sbei
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and I talked a number of times about this diagnosis, but came
to the conclusion that it seemed like the Chiari was causing a
lot of these symptoms, and his best guess is that the ozone
caused some brain swelling, and then coupled with the
lumbar puncture during that investigative process allowed a
negative pressure effect to develop in the spinal canal, which
allowed the tonsils to drop, and hence she had a symptomatic
Chiari.
ROA 612 (emphasis added). Thus, the Independent Medical Examination gave greater
weight to the Gudmundsons' theory than Dr. Reichman actually stated in his letter. Had
higher evidentiary standards been applied, Dr. Reichman's assessment of Dr. Sbei's "best
guess" as to the cause would have been inadmissible as hearsay and inconclusive.
Second, the Gudmundsons presented no evidence that the Labor Commission's
conclusion that Mrs. Gudmundson's injuries were not caused by exposure to ozone was
incorrect. The Gudmundsons argue that the reports offered by retained experts Dr. Kaye
Kilburn and Dr. Douglas Rollins call this conclusion into question, but they do not.
These experts' opinions concern chemicals other than ozone and they do not conclude
that Mrs. Gudmundson's injuries were caused by exposure to ozone alone. Dr. Kilbum
concluded:
The sequence of events is explained best by ozone inhalation
producing increased absorption of it and the background
chemicals: chlorine, phosphoric acid, sodium hydroxide
hydrofluorosalic acid-flourine and resmethrin, a pyrethroid
insecticide, and detergents that cause intolerance to many
chemicals manifested by headache, reduced sense of smell,
memory loss, dryness of skin and mucous membrane. This
made Wendy Gudmundson totally and permanently disabled.
This expert opinion is rendered to the legal standard of more
probable than not.

17

ROA, at 686 (emphasis added). Dr. Kilburn concluded only that it was "more probable
than not" that the best explanation for Mrs. Gudmundson's medical problems was
inhalation of ozone and eight other chemicals. Even more suspect is Dr. Rollins'
opinion. He concluded:
OPINION
It is my opinion that Wendy Gudmundson's exposure to the
ozone laundry purification while she worked at the Wasatch
Laundry facility exposed her to ozone and to the disinfection
byproducts catalyzed by the ozone. These substances resulted
in the severe, intractable frontal headaches that resulted in her
admission to Timpanogos Hospital on December 20, 2004.
ROA, at 692. This opinion is troubling for several reasons. First, it concludes only that
the exposure to "substances" "resulted in her admission to Timpanogos Hospital on
December 20, 2004;" however, as Dr. Rollins notes earlier in his opinion, "She was
admitted to Timpanogos Hospital on December 20, 2004 where she had a normal brain
CT scan, a normal brain MRL and a lumbar puncture to rule out meningitis." ROA, at
691 (emphasis added). Thus, Dr. Rollins concludes only that exposure to substances led
to a hospital visit where no problems were found or diagnosed. Second, Dr. Rollins'
conclusion is based on multiple "substances," not ozone. However, the Gudmundsons'
Complaint and First Amended Complaint allege only injuries stemming from exposure to
ozone. They do not mention other chemicals. Thus, these opinions do not undermine the
Labor Commission's ruling that Mrs. Gudmundson's injuries were not caused by
exposure to ozone.
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The Gudmundsons also state in their brief that additional time for discovery was
warranted because they recently changed counsel. However, the Gudmundsons had
ample time prior to changing counsel to conduct discovery. They filed their Complaint
on September 20, 2005. Del Ozone filed its motion for summary judgment on September
10, 2007. Thus, the Gudmundsons had 720 days in which to gather evidence supporting
their claims. During that time, an attorney planning meeting report and two amended
case management orders were entered (on June 7, 2006; October 10, 2006; and June 6,
2007; respectively). Also during that time, defendants engaged in discovery, including
several depositions. The Gudmundsons offer no explanation for why they were unable to
conduct the discovery they request during those 720 days.
The District Court noted all of this at the hearing on motions for summary
judgment, stating:
[T]here is a Rule 56(f) motion raised by the plaintiff, and I
will address that first. Basically, I'm denying that motion. I
don't believe that the Rule 56(f) continuance has merit.
The case was filed in 2005. This case has had a - two
years of discovery and three case management orders. The
fact that the parties - and at least two of those case
management conferences I have convened by telephone and
spoken with Counsel...
The last case management order, which was the second
amended, basically the third case management order, but set
fact discovery deadline of November 5* of 2007. The only
real argument is that this is a complex case, and the deadlines
have been insufficient.
I cannot agree. First of all, while I recognize that
plaintiff's Counsel has joined the matter after the part - after
it had initiated, I went back and reviewed the submission. I
note that there was no leave of Court noted under Rule 74.
Any counsel substituting was to certify they would comply
with the notice - with the existing hearing schedules and
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deadlines, if their appearance was not to be entered solely
upon - you know, without Court approval. I received no such
request and no such commitment.
Most importantly - these are sort of procedural
problems; but more importantly, I don't find that plaintiff has
identified exactly what discovery is needed to address the
summary judgment motions, why that information is solely in
control of the movants, or what good faith efforts it has made
to secure it. I think under our law, this is insufficient to state
a basis for a Rule 56(f) continuance.
Transcript of Hearing, ROA 1890, at 4. The Gudmundsons had two years to gather
evidence supporting to their claim that Mrs. Gudmundson was injured by exposure to
ozone and they did not.
VI.

The Gudmundsons filed the present Complaint claiming Mrs.
Gudmundson was injured by exposure to ozone, not byproducts of
ozone.

As noted above, on September 20, 2005, the Gudmundsons filed a Complaint in
the present case. In their Complaint, the Gudmundsons alleged:
Mrs. Gudmundson's medical condition was caused by ozone
overexposure due to fact that ozone generator in the Wasatch
Laundry Facility lacked a ventilation system, a fresh air
replenishing system, automatic shut-off, audible alarm, visual
alarm, a recapture system for the ozone and the other required
equipment under OSHA guidelines.
Complaint, at^[ 30, ROA 6 (emphasis added). The Gudmundsons amended their
Complaint on December 4, 2006. In their First Amended Complaint, the Gudmundsons
made the same allegation:
Mrs. Gudmundson's medical condition was caused by ozone
overexposure due to the fact that the ozone generator in the
Wasatch Laundry Facility lacked a ventilation system , a
fresh air replenishing system, automatic shut-off, audible
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alarm, visual alarm, a recapture for the ozone, and other
required equipment under OSHA guidelines.
First Amended Complaint, at f 33, ROA 125 (emphasis added). Neither of the
Gudmundsons' complaints mentions injuries caused by "byproducts of ozone." Thus, the
Labor Commission ruled upon the very issue raised in the Gudmundsons' Complaint and
First Amended Complaint.
In their memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, filed on October 15,
2007, the Gudmundsons attempted to amend their claims. In that memorandum, the
Gudmundsons stated:
25.
The Labor Commission's opinion was limited
to "ozone exposure." See Exhibit Y, Utah Labor
Commission's Conclusions of Law ("The petitioner did not
suffer a compensable occupational disease as a result of
exposure to ozone in December 2004 ...").
26.
Wendy's injuries are not claimed to have
occurred solely from ozone but from exposure to ozone in
combination with other chemicals and materials. See Exhibit
"Z", Plaintiff's Disclosure of Expert Witness (Kay H.
Kilburn, M.D.).
ROA 388. The District Court noted this improper maneuver, stating, "Well, there seems
to be kind of a moving target, in terms of what the theory of causation was. One initially it was that it was exposure to Ozone. Then it was that there was - you know, Oz
- the exposure to Ozone and to other chemicals." Transcript from Hearing on Motions
for Summary Judgment, ROA 1890, at 34.
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VII. Summary Judgment and Notice of Appeal.
On March 24, 2008, The District Court entered an order granting summary
judgment to Del Ozone and Johnson Controls. On April 2, 2008, the Gudmundsons filed
a notice of appeal. On May 28, 2008, The District Court entered an order granting
summary judgment to OzoneSolutions. On June 4, 2008, the Gudmundsons filed a notice
of appeal. On June 27, 2008, this Court issued a Notice of Decision and ordered that the
Gudmundsons' initial appeal had been dismissed without prejudice to any subsequent
timely appeal. On June 30, 2008, the Gudmundsons filed a third notice of appeal.
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VL ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court did not Abuse its Discretion by Denying
the Gudmundsons' Rule 56(f) Motion.
A.

Standard of Review

This Court has stated, "[w]e review the denial of a rule 56(f) motion for an abuse
of discretion." Overstock.com, Inc. v. Smartbargains, Inc., 2008 UT 55, f 20, 192 P.3d
858 (Citation omitted). "We will not reverse the district court's decision to grant or deny
a rule 56(f) motion for discovery unless it "exceeds the limits of reasonability"." Id.
(Citations omitted). 'The "limits of reasonability" standard is based on the specific
circumstances of each case - there is not a "bright line" test for determining whether the
district court abused its discretion." Id., at f 22 (Citation omitted). The Court continued:
Some of the relevant factors in determining whether a rule
56(f) motion is warranted include, but are not limited to: (1)
an examination of the party's rule 56(f) affidavit to determine
whether the discovery sought will uncover disputed material
facts that will prevent the grant of summary judgment or if
the party requesting discovery is simply on a "fishing
expedition," (2) whether the party opposing summary
judgment motion has had adequate time to conduct discovery
and has been conscientious in pursuing such discovery, and
(3) the diligence of the party moving for summary judgment
in responding to the discovery requests provided by the party
opposing summary judgment.
Id. (Citations omitted).
B.

The discovery sought will not establish that the generator was
defective.

It is undisputed that OzoneSolutions installed the laundry ozone system at the
Bluffdale Prison without any assistance or consultation from Del Ozone. As part of that
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system, OzoneSolutions purchased an ozone generator from Del Ozone. Del Ozone
shipped the generator to the Bluffdale Prison where OzoneSolutions installed it. Mr.
Downey's testimony that the generator functioned properly following installation is
unrefuted. Following installation, Mr. Downey tested the generator to ensure it was
functioning properly. He testified:
Q: And what is the - the purpose of the machine is to
generate ozone; right? The purpose of the ozone generator is
to generate ozone?
A: The primary component of a laundry ozone system is an
ozone generator. The ozone generator is a combination of
oxygen generator and ozone generator. It takes the ambient
air, which has 20.9 percent oxygen, strips the nitrogen, and
hydrogen air and increases that to 95 percent and then takes
that 95 percent oxygen over to what they call a corona
discharge cell, which is an electrical charge that splits the 0 2
molecule apart and makes ozone. So it makes higher
concentrations of oxygen and then makes ozone. So it is a
dual-purpose generator.
Q: When you installed this machine, did you check to make
sure that it was doing both of those functions?
A: Yes.
Q: And it was doing both of those functions as of December
10?
A: Yes.
Q: Or 9th when you did the installation?
A: Yes.
Deposition of John Downey, at 172-173 (ROA 251).
The discovery the Gudmundsons sought in their rule 56(f) affidavit will not refute
or call into question Mr. Downey's testimony. In their affidavit, the Gudmundsons
sought additional time for discovery for four reasons:
1) the interpretation of Mrs. Gudmundson's MRIs, taken in
December, 2004, June, 2006, and again in August, 2006;
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2) information on the neurotoxicity or carcinogenic effects of
an ozone water disinfectant system;
3) information on water being pulled from a geo-thermal well
below the Utah State Prison; and
4) further information from Del Ozone relating to Del
Ozone's denial of whether any of its "instruments that are
similar to the Device in question [the ozone generator at the
Utah State Prison] have ever been known to cause a health
problem as a result of the use or improper use of said similar
device," in response to interrogatories from Plaintiffs.
Appellants' Brief, at 44 (quoting ROA 388). None of these four items would have
yielded evidence that the generator was defective. The first three - Mrs. Gudmundson's
MRIs, toxicity reports, and information on geo-thermal wells - are completely unrelated
to the generator. The fourth item - information from Del Ozone about prior problems on
similar instruments - would not have provided information on whether the generator used
at the prison was defective. At best, this information would have revealed the rate of
error for the generator model, but not for the specific generator installed at the Bluffdale
Prison. That generator functioned properly according to the expert who installed and
inspected it. Because the requested information would have had no bearing on whether
the generator in this case was defective, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the Gudmundsons' Rule 56(f) motion for additional time.
C.

The Gudmundsons had ample time to conduct discovery.

The Gudmundsons advance two arguments that the District Court abused its
discretion in denying their motion: first, the district court was wrong in concluding that
they had "two and a half years" to uncover evidence to support their claims, and second,
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that the district court belittled the fact that they needed additional time due to changing
counsel. These arguments are without merit and are unsupported by the law.
The Gudmundsons did in fact have two and a half years to discover and present
evidence supporting their claims. They filed their Complaint on September 20, 2005.
The hearing on the motions for summary judgment, where Judge Lindberg granted Del
Ozone's Motion for Summary Judgment, occurred on March 3, 2008. Thus, two and half
years elapsed between filing of the Complaint and entry of judgment, and the
Gudmundsons failed to conduct any of the sought-after discovery.
The Gudmundsons argue that "less than two years" elapsed between the filing of
the Complaint and Del Ozone's Motion for Summary Judgment. This does little to
advance their argument because it provides no explanation for why they didn't conduct
discovery over the two-year period. It is undisputed that 720 days passed between
September 20, 2005, the date they filed their Complaint, and September 10, 2007, the
date Del Ozone moved for summary judgment. During that time, an attorney planning
meeting report and two amended case management orders were entered (on June 7, 2006;
October 10, 2006; and June 6, 2007; respectively). Also during that time, Del Ozone,
OzoneSolutions, and Johnson Controls engaged in discovery, including several
depositions. The Gudmundsons offer no explanation for why they were unable to
conduct the discovery requested in their 56(f) affidavit during those 720 days.
Rather than explain why they were unable to conduct this discovery, the
Gudmundsons blame Judge Lindberg. They complain that a notation in the margin of a
brief noting their excessive delay somehow prejudiced their ability over the prior two
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years to conduct discovery. This complaint lacks substance and tact. First, the notation
merely indicates what the Gudmundsons ask this Court to ignore - that they had ample
time to conduct discovery. It states, "Too bad - Ct. unlikely to grant a 3 rd extension on
this case where P's have been represented by competent counsel through case &
discovery has proceeded w/o interruption." The Gudmundsons' Brief, at 46. Each of the
statements contained in this notation are true. It is true that the Gudmundsons had been
represented by counsel throughout the case. It is also true that discovery had proceeded
without interruption. Even if the notation somehow suggested bias, it was made after the
720-day period for discovery had expired. Thus, it offers no explanation of why the
Gudmundsons were unable to conduct this discovery during that two-year period.
The Gudmundsons argue that this case "closely resembles the situation found in
Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977);" however,
they fail to explain how. In fact, they don't recite any of the facts from Strand that they
allege are similar to the facts here. A close inspection of Strand reveals that it is nothing
like the case at hand. In Strand, "[t]he complaint was filed [on] February 13, 1976." Id.,
at 192. On March 9, 1976, "defendants filed a motion to dismiss." Id. "On March 25,
1976 plaintiff's counsel filed an affidavit" requesting additional time to conduct
discovery. Id. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on March 26,
1976, and granted the motion on March 30, 1976. See Id., at 193. Thus, only 24 days
passed between the time plaintiffs filed their complaint and defendants moved to dismiss.
On these facts, the Court held:
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[T]here had not been sufficient time since the inception of the
law suit for plaintiff to utilize discovery procedures, and
thereby have an opportunity to cross-examine the moving
party. The pleadings had not been closed, and there were
complex legal issues posed, with an inadequate factual basis.
Under such circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion to
grant defendant's motion. The court should have ordered a
continuance to permit discovery, or denied the motion for
summary judgment, without prejudice to its renewal, after
adequate time had elapsed in which plaintiff could have
obtained the desired information.
Id., at 194.
The facts in Strand are nothing like the facts present here. First, Strand involved a
motion to dismiss filed before any discovery had taken place. This case involves motions
for summary judgment that were filed after extensive discovery had occurred. Second, in
Strand, only 24 days elapsed between the time plaintiffs filed their complaint and
defendants moved to dismiss. No discovery could have taken place in so short a time.
Here, 720 days elapsed between the time the Gudmundsons filed their complaint and Del
Ozone filed its motion for summary judgment. This was ample time to conduct
discovery. In fact, each of the defendants conducted discovery and submitted substantial
evidence in support of their respective motions for summary judgment. Finally, the
Court in Strand ruled that the judge had abused her discretion because "there had not
been sufficient time since the inception of the law suit'' for plaintiff to utilize discovery
procedures. Id. (Emphasis added). By contrast, the Gudmundsons had a full two years
since the inception of their law suit to conduct discovery.
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The present case more closely resembles Jensen v. Smith, 2007 UT App 152, 163
P.3d 657, and Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In both
of these cases, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that the district judge did not abuse his or
her discretion in denying a rule 56(f) motion because the plaintiffs had been dilatory. In
Jensen, "almost two and a half years elapsed between the inception of this lawsuit and
Defendant's motion for summary judgment." Jensen v. Smith, 2007 UT App at \ 4. In
Jones, "there was sufficient time for both parties to conduct discovery since the inception
of the lawsuit some twenty-six months earlier, again weighs in favor of the trial court's
ruling." Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d at 562. Like the plaintiffs in Jensen and
Jones, the Gudmundsons had two years to conduct the discovery they sought. This was
sufficient time and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the the
Gudmundsons were dilatory.
D.

Del Ozone's refusal to stipulate to a third extension of discovery
deadlines did not prejudice the Gudmundsons.

The Gudmundsons do not argue that Del Ozone was not diligent in responding to
their discovery requests. Instead, they argue that Del Ozone refused to stipulate to extend
discovery. The record, however, demonstrates that Del Ozone did not object to extending
discovery for the Gudmundsons on two prior occasions. Del Ozone participated in an
Attorneys' Planning Meeting on June 7, 2006, and stipulated to amend the Case
Management Order on October 10, 2006. The Case Management Order was later
amended a second time, on June 6, 2007. Thus, Del Ozone provided the Gudmundsons
multiple opportunities to conduct discovery. Del Ozone was under no duty to extend
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discovery a third time simply because the Gudmundsons changed counsel. Moreover, the
Gudmundsons have failed to demonstrate how this prejudiced them in light of the
preceding two years in which they could have conducted this discovery.
For each of the reasons stated above, the District Court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the Gudmundsons' Rule 56(f) motion and its ruling should be affirmed.
II.

The District Court correctly granted summary to Del Ozone because
the Gudmundsons presented no evidence that the ozone generator was
defective.
A.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c). The Utah Supreme Court
"review[s] the district court's decision to grant summary judgment for correctness,
affording the trial court no deference." Crestwood Cove Apartments Business Trust v.
Turner, 2007 UT 48, f 10, 164 P.3d 1247. "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
[the Court] view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party." Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center,
Inc., 2003 UT 23, f 2, 70 P.3d 904.
B.

The Gudmundsons' Claims Against Del Ozone hinge upon a
Defect in the Generator.

In their Complaint and First Amended Complaint, the Gudmundsons raised four
claims for relief against Del Ozone: (1) Strict Liability - Defective Product, (2) Inference
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of Negligence - Res Ipsa Loquitur, (3) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability,
and (4) Negligent Manufacture. See Complaint and First Amended Complaint, ROA 118 and 119-135 respectively. Each of these claims sounds in products liability, as they
must, because Del Ozone did nothing more than sell an ozone generator to
OzoneSolutions. This Court has stated, "[p]roducts liability always requires proof of a
defective product, which can include "manufacturing flaws, design defects, and
inadequate warnings regarding use"." Bishop v. Gentec, Inc., 2002 UT 36, f 25, 48 P.3d
218 (citation omitted). "Alternative theories are available to prove different categories of
defective product, including negligence, strict liability, or implied warranty of
merchantability." Id., quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability § 2 cmt. N
(1997). The Court continued,
Alternative theories entail different evidentiary burdens. For
example, proof of a defect under a negligent manufacture
theory will necessitate proof that the defective condition of
the product was the result of negligence in manufacturing
process, or proof that the manufacturer knew or should have
known of the defective condition, whereas these elements are
unnecessary under strict liability or breach of warranty
theories. Whatever the theory, however, the defendant's
liability is for the defective product, and not merely for any
underlying negligence.
Id. (Emphasis added) (Citation omitted). Thus, each of the Gudmundsons' claims for
relief against Del Ozone requires evidence that the ozone generator was defective.
C.

The Gudmundsons Presented No Evidence the Generator was
Defective.

In the present case, the district court correctly ruled that the Gudmundsons
presented no evidence that the ozone generator was defective, and therefore, Del Ozone
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was entitled to summary judgment. In fact, the only evidence submitted to the district
court showed that the ozone generator was functioning properly after OzoneSolutions
installed it in the laundry ozone system at the Bluffdale Prison. John Downey, the
owner-operator of OzoneSolutions who installed the ozone generator into the ozone
laundry system, testified:
Q: And what is the - the purpose of the machine is to
generate ozone; right? The purpose of the ozone generator is
to generate ozone?
A: The primary component of a laundry ozone system is an
ozone generator. The ozone generator is a combination of
oxygen generator and ozone generator. It takes the ambient
air, which has 20.9 percent oxygen, strips the nitrogen, and
hydrogen air and increases that to 95 percent and then takes
that 95 percent oxygen over to what they call a corona
discharge cell, which is an electrical charge that splits the 0 2
molecule apart and makes ozone. So it makes higher
concentrations of oxygen and then makes ozone. So it is a
dual-purpose generator.
Q: When you installed this machine, did you check to make
sure that it was doing both of those functions?
A: Yes.
Q: And it was doing both of those functions as of December
10?
A: Yes.
Q: Or 9th when you did the installation?
A: Yes.
Deposition of John Downey, at 172-173, ROA 251. This evidence is unrefuted.
The Gudmundsons contend the ozone generator was defective because it "did not
include an ambient air monitor, for example, nor did it have an automatic shut-off valve
that would automatically engage if pollutant levels exceeded EPA or OSHA limits." The
Gudmundsons' Brief, at 47. To support this position, the Gudmundsons cite ROA 559570. These citations refer to deposition testimony of John Downey regarding the
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ventilation of the laundry ozone system, not the generator. The District Court correctly
distinguished between problems in the laundry room's ventilation and the generator itself,
stating:
I do agree with Del Ozone that at least based on my review of
the submissions, the plaintiff presented no evidence that the
Ozone generator was defective. While it is true that there
appears to be some evidence that there may have been some
venting issues, I found nothing that indicated factually a
problem with the generator itself.
Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing, at 6, ROA 1890.
The absence of an ambient air monitor or automatic shut-off valve are not defects.
To qualify as a defect, the condition must be a manufacturing flaw, a design defect, or an
inadequate warning. See House v. Armour of America, Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 547 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) (Citations omitted). The Gudmundsons have cited no cases holding that the
absence of ambient air monitors and automatic shut-off valves qualify as defects. These
items are accessories. Their absence does not mean that the generator was not
functioning properly, that the generator was defectively designed, or that the generator
was not accompanied with adequate warnings. Thus, the lack of an ambient air monitor
or automatic shut-off valve does not establish a defect under the law and cannot sustain
claims for relief for products liability, strict liability, negligent installation or breach of
implied warranty. The Gudmundsons submitted no other evidence that the generator was
defective, therefore, summary judgment should be affirmed.
Even if this Court was inclined to agree with the Gudmundsons that the absence of
an ambient air monitor and automatic shut-off constitute defects, OzoneSolutions, not
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Del Ozone, decided not to include these items in the laundry ozone system. Mr. Downey
testified that this decision was made exclusively by OzoneSolutions, without consulting
Del Ozone:
Q: Do you know why nobody talked about a monitor in this
case?
A: I don't believe with the Del Ozone generator an ambient
ozone monitor is necessary.
Q: So it was your personal call, it wasn't necessary A: It is OzoneSolutions' call. It is not involved with our
system.
Q: So OzoneSolutions' call was, "We don't even need to
bring up the monitor with the State of Utah because it is
unnecessary"?
A: Correct.
Deposition of John Downey, at 169-171, ROA 248. Because OzoneSolutions unilaterally
decided not to include the monitor, they should be responsible for any resulting liabilities.
Del Ozone was not informed about the decision to proceed with installation without an
ambient air monitor, therefore, it should not be the party responsible for that decision.
The Gudmundsons have also argued that the entire laundry ozone system installed
by OzoneSolutions was defective, however, such assertions do not sustain a claim against
Del Ozone. The Utah Court of Appeals has stated, "the after-sale negligent installation of
a nondefective product does not give rise to a product liability claim." See Utah Local
Gov't Trust v. Wheeler Machinery Co., 2006 UT App 513, f 12, 154 P.3d 175; citing
Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115, f 23, 61 P.3d 1068 (stating that because a
negligently installed machine was not defective when purchased, the case was one of
negligence and not of product liability). It is undisputed that Del Ozone's role in this
matter was limited to filling the purchase order submitted by OzoneSolutions for an
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ozone generator. It is also undisputed that the ozone generator was functioning properly
after installation. Therefore, products liability claims cannot be sustained against Del
Ozone.
D.

A Qualified, Vetted Expert is Required to Testify that the Generator
was Defective.

The Gudmundsons' assertion that the absence of an ambient air monitor or an
automatic shut-off is not only unfounded, it is also unreliable. The Gudmundsons and
their counsel are unqualified to testify about defects in ozone generators. In order for the
Gudmundsons' assertions to constitute evidence that the district court could have
considered, they would have needed to be offered by a qualified expert who had filed a
report and been subject to cross-examination at a deposition. The Gudmundsons have
designated no such expert. As such, their assertions are mere arguments, and the district
court correctly concluded that they do not constitute evidence of a defect.
In fact, the only person involved in this case who was qualified to testify as to
whether the absence of an ambient air monitor or automatic shut-off constituted a defect
in the generator was Mr. Downey. Yet, Mr. Downey offered no such testimony. Because
the Gudmundsons rely only upon their own unfounded assertions rather than the
testimony of qualified, vetted experts, the district court correctly concluded that there was
no evidence of a defect and Del Ozone was entitled to summary judgment on the claims
against it on this ground.
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III.

This Court should affirm summary judgment on the ground that Del
Ozone did not owe the Gudmundsons any duty.

This Court recently stated, "on appeal, we may affirm the district court "on any
legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs
from that stated by the [district] court"." Ockey v. Lehrner, 2008 UT 37, f 42, 189 P.3d
51 (Citation omitted). This Court has also previously stated:
[A]n appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from
if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on
the record, even though such ground or theory differs from
that stated by the [district] court to be the basis of its ruling
[and] even though such ground or theory is not urged or
argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower
court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower
court.
State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, f 19, 147 P.3d 448 (citation omitted).
Summary judgment should also be affirmed because Del Ozone owed the
Gudmundsons no duty. "'The question of whether a duty exists is a question of law' and
is reviewed for correctness." Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 1000 UT 20 \ 9 (citation
omitted). "[I]t is axiomatic that one may not be liable to another in tort absent a duty."
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, %l 1 (citation omitted). "Any analysis of a
tort claim, then, begins with an inquiry into the existence and scope of the duty owed the
plaintiff by the defendant." Id.
In deciding not to grant summary judgment on this ground, Judge Lindberg stated,
"I don't agree with Del Ozone that it's - that the connection between its role as
manufacturer of the Ozone System is so attenuated to the injury of the worker in this
case, Ms. Gudmundson, that it was unforeseeable. I just cannot - cannot agree with
36

that." Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing, ROA 1890, at 6. Judge Lindberg later
clarified that she meant the ozone generator, not the laundry ozone system. Later in the
hearing, Judge Lindberg added, "I'll tell you that the reason why I was not persuaded is
because if you are manufacturing a component, and you know that that component is use of that component is for laun - in laundry ozone systems, it is not unforeseeable that
an operator of a laundry ozone system employing that component could be injured by a
problem." Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing, ROA 1890, at 31 (emphasis
added).
The Court, however, is required to consider additional factors prior to determining
whether a duty exists. Specifically, a court should consider (1) the extent that the
manufacturer could foresee that its actions would cause harm, (2) the likelihood of injury,
(3) the magnitude of the burden guarding against it, and (4) the consequences of placing
the burden on the defendant, prior to determining whether a duty of reasonable care
exists. See Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 1000 UT 20 f 12. "A relationship that is highly
attenuated is less likely to be accompanied by a duty than one, for example, in which
parties are in privity of contract." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, f 16. "A
person who possesses important, even vital, information of interest to another has no
legal duty to communicate the information where no relationship between the parties
exists." A/., 117.
It is undisputed that Del Ozone's only role in this matter was to fill the purchase
order submitted by OzoneSolutions for an ozone generator. The District Court ruled that
this alone created a duty because it was "not unforeseeable" that an operator of the
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laundry ozone system could be injured; however, Del Ozone's relationship to Mrs.
Gudmundson was too attenuated to warrant imposition of a duty. Del Ozone was
removed from Mrs. Gudmundson by three parties. The State of Utah, Mrs.
Gudmundson's employer, contracted with Johnson Controls to install a laundry ozone
system at the prison. Johnson Controls, in turn, hired OzoneSolutions to perform the
installation. And OzoneSolutions purchased the generator from Del Ozone. Thus, it was
not readily foreseeable that Mrs. Gudmundson would be injured as a result of Del Ozone
selling a non-defective ozone generator to OzoneSolutions.
The other factors weigh heavily in favor of imposing no duty on Del Ozone. First,
there was little likelihood that someone would be injured by the generator. This is
confirmed by the Gudmundsons' failure to submit any evidence that Mrs. Gudmundson
was injured by exposure to ozone, the chemical emitted by the ozone generator. In fact,
as noted above, the Gudmundsons changed course in their opposition to summary
judgment, claiming that Mrs. Gudmundson was injured by exposure to byproducts of
ozone. Because the generator emits only ozone, there is no evidence of injury and this
factor weighs heavily against imposition of a duty.
Similarly, the factors concerning the burden and consequences of imposing a duty
on Del Ozone weigh heavily against imposition of a duty. The burden of imposing a duty
would be substantial. Such a ruling would effectively require Del Ozone to monitor
installation and use of each item it sells. In this case, the generator was sold to
OzoneSolutions, an experienced installer of laundry ozone systems. The burden is better
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bom by OzoneSolutions, and by Johnson Controls, who hired them to install the laundry
ozone system, including the generator.
The balance of factors weighs against imposition of a duty, therefore, summary
judgment in favor of Del Ozone should be affirmed on this ground as well.
IV.

Summary judgment should also be affirmed on the ground of collateral
estoppel.

The collateral estoppel arguments have been briefed by counsel for
OzoneSolutions and Johnson Controls. Del Ozone hereby incorporates each and every
argument in favor of affirming summary judgment on the ground of collateral estoppel
made and described by counsel for OzoneSolutions and Johnson Controls in thenrespective briefs.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, summary judgment in favor of Del Ozone should be
affirmed.
DATED this H " day of December, 2008.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

John R. Lund
•
R. Scott Young
Attorneys for Appellee Del Ozone
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